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The major problem concerning Hegel's four world-
historical realms is this: How are we to view them—as 
categories of historical explanation or as philosophi-
cal concepts? Does the Oriental Realm really charac-
terize ancient China, ancient India, ancient Persia, 
and ancient Israel? Does Hegel's representation of the 
Greek Realm really apply to ancient Greece? Does 
Hegel's Roman Realm really reflect the Roman Empire? 
And does the Germanic Realm really typify the reborn 
Prussia of the post-Napoleonic era? To be sure, their 
very names—'Oriental', 'Greek', 'Roman', and 'German-
ic'—suggest that they are indeed intended to be 
categories of historical explanation rather than philo-
sophical concepts. 
But it is quite possible, taking these four realms 
just at their most superficial level and using the 
posthumous lectures as our text, to show that Hegel's 
historical categories simply do not fit the historical 
facts. It is also possible to show that history has 
not been as simple in the East as Hegel has chosen to 
depict it. It is easy, therefore, to conclude that 
because such an analysis of the four realms would 
reveal many strictly historical inaccuracies, Hegel's 
philosophy of history carries neither historical nor 
philosophical merit. Hegel was no historian—and it is 
certainly true that his philosophy of history severely 
lacks historical merit—but it is a most unfair and un-
justified leap to say also that his philosophy of 
history lacks philosophical merit. Of course, to 
demonstrate that it does have philosophical merit is a 
difficult task, much more difficult than demonstrating 
its lack of merit in other respects. 
Hegel made a mistake in naming his four realms af-
ter specific geographical regions, for this nomencla-
ture suggests an affinity with certain peoples and with 
certain historical periods which is plainly not plausi-
ble. The names, however, must have seemed convenient 
to him, since they effectively connected his illustra-
tions with the ideas he wished to illustrate. The 
historical China, for example, is only an illustra-
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tion—a flawed illustration—and not the basis, of 
Hegel's idea of the Oriental Realm. Unfortunately, 
Hegel has immeasurably aided the critic who would claim 
that, for Hegel, specific historical periods serve as 
the conceptual foundations, rather than as illustra-
tions, of the four realms.* Hegel would have done much 
better to have named his four realms after the purely 
speculative categories which are their true basis, in-
stead of after the historical peoples, periods, and 
regions which have only some tendency to illustrate 
human governance in its various aspects of monistic, 
pluralistic, and dualistic organization. 
How do we begin to build the picture of the four 
realms as philosophical ideas instead of as historical 
categories? Like so many of Hegel's ideas, the four 
realms are probably best understood theologically. 
Indeed his whole systematic philosophy is best under-
stood theologically. John Findlay has asserted that 
Hegel alone among philosophers has borrowed the entire 
cast of his thought from Christianity.' This means 
that, in Hegel, there is a creation and a salvation— 
and that the middle ground between these two poles is 
history. The world is the arena in which creatures 
work out their salvation—following the reason provided 
by the absolute spirit which we call God-'-and this is a 
historical process, a logical process with a specified 
beginning and a specified end, both in eternity. Thus, 
for Hegel, all history is sacred history, a history of 
salvation (Heilsgeschichte), the ordered epistrophic 
process by which God, the Absolute, induces God's 
creatures to return to God by their own free will, and 
thus to complete God's own perfection as a concrete 
universal. It may be shown, elsewhere and with some 
difficulty, that Hegel's logic, his phenomenological 
structure, indeed, his entire system, especially inso-
far as it concerns religion, is founded upon Neo-
Platonism—specifically, it is firmly rooted in the 
traditional Christian Neo-Platonism of Augustine and 
his successors. But the point to be made now is that 
Hegel's four realms are only retainable as philosophi-
cal concepts if we discard their geographical names and 
rename them according to their philosophical and 
theological underpinnings. Toward this end, consider 
the following schematic representation of the four 
realms: 
1. The Oriental Realm = The Unmediated Monistic Realm. 
A. The despotic theocracy of a single patriarchal 
figure. 
B. Religious order and political order are one in 
form and content. 
C. Spirit is bestowed upon people from on high. 
D. Abstract universal. 
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E. Roughly analogous to Family as the first 
moment of Sittlichkeit in the Philosophy of 
Right. 
2. The Greek Realm = The Pluralistic Realm. 
A. The free autonomy of each individual citizen. 
B. Religious order and political order have many 
forms, but one content. 
C. Spirit arises from among the people. 
D. Concrete particulars. 
E. Roughly analogous to Civil Society in its pure 
form as the moral expression of the principle 
of personality, as the second moment of Sitt-
lichkeit in the Philosophy of Right. 
3. The Roman Realm = The Dualistic Realm. 
A. The legalistic heteronomy opposing citizen to 
citizen, estate to estate, religion to govern-
ment, etc. 
B. Religious order and political order have dif-
ferent forms and contents. 
C. Spirit is "dead"—between "Good Friday" and 
"Easter." 
D. Abstract particulars. 
E. Roughly analogous to Civil Society in its 
decay as the second moment of Sittlichkeit in 
the Philosophy of Right. 
4. The Germanic Realm = The Mediated Monistic Realm. 
A. The ordered ethical theonomy of the entire 
community and of all of its members. 
B. Religious order and political order each have 
their own forms, but the same content. 
C. Spirit permeates, both descending from the 
universal and rising up from the particulars. 
D. Concrete universal. 
E. Strikingly analogous to the State as the third 
and culminating moment of Sittlichkeit in the 
Philosophy of Right. 
F. Analogous to the earthly model of the spirit-
ual ekklesia described in the New Testament. 
Hegel presents the four world-historical realms in 
their necessary chronological—or logical—order, ac-
cording to the necessity of history, i.e., according to 
the necessity of Heilsgeschichte, the history of the 
separation of creatures from their Creator, and of 
their return to that Creator. The Oriental Realm is 
the realm of unmediated monism, to the extent that it 
is the merely patriarchal situation in which all spirit 
(Geist) is invested in the person of the father, and in 
which no-one except the father has any individuality, 
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freedom, or personhood. The Greek Realm is the realm 
of pluralism, the escape from this oriental despotism, 
where every indivdual free spirit enjoys autonomy. The 
Roman Realm is the realm of dualism—properly speaking, 
the dualism of monism and pluralism—the dissolution 
and breakdown of the Greek Realm, where individual au-
tonomy has proceeded through anarchy and has become 
merely formal or legal individuality, where the citi-
zen, or some integral aspect of the psychologically 
bifurcated citizen, is opposed to the political order, 
the religious order, and other citizens, as an adver-
sary in a bitter, dog-eat-dog world. The Germanic 
Realm is the realm of mediated monism, the resurrected 
glory from the death and decay of the Roman Realm, the 
best possible worldly analogue to the Christian ideal 
of the otherworldly Kingdom of God. 
Hegel saw the Germanic Realm as the most adequate, 
the most concrete, in short,, the "highest" of the four 
on the ladder to the Absolute. On this ladder, beneath 
the Germanic Realm would come the Greek Realm, then the 
Oriental Realm, and the Roman Realm "lowest" of all. 
We can detect the rationale of this ranking from the 
relation of religion and politics in each, together 
with the relation of form and content in each, as 
follows: 1) In the Roman Realm, religion has a dif-
ferent form and a different content from politics, so 
that the situation entails a profound lack of real 
unity on all levels. 2) In the Oriental Realm, relig-
ion has the same form and the same content as politics, 
but this still does not show any real unity, for this 
content is unmediated, and in fact is only a "formal" 
content. 3) In the Greek Realm, religion and politics 
each have free, amorphous, non-dogmatic forms, but 
still they have the same content, which constitutes a 
vast improvement over the Roman Realm toward mediating 
the content, and thus toward unifying the realm in a 
concrete way, even though this realm remains inadequate 
because of its essential disorganization grounded in 
large measure upon the particularity which at this 
stage still inheres in the individuality upon which the 
society is based. 4) In the Germanic Realm, religion 
has a different form, but the same content as politics, 
so that the religious establishment and the political 
establishment are finally unified by virtue of the one 
truth which they both seek, while at the same time 
serving as "checks and balances" on each other, work-
ing, by virtue of their two forms, against error, 
tyranny, and one-sidedness in their progress toward the 
actualization of this truth. This ranking suggests 
that Hegel values content above form—which is not open 
to dispute—but values religion and statecraft 
equally—which is a point debated hotly ever since the 
time of the Young Hegelians. 
Thus, we may see the Oriental and the Roman Realms 
as essentially opposites: In the former, in which 
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religion and politics formally coincide, the unity of 
content is imposed, not freely or morally chosen by the 
individual; whereas in the latter, in which religion 
and politics are distinct both formally and substan-
tively, general social division reigns, and the indiv-
idual becomes "too free," i.e., "lost" in the sense 
that he or she cannot realize everything to which a 
human being is entitled for a happy, fulfilled life. 
In this realm, the individual is forced by circumstance 
to choose between serving the political order and serv-
ing the religious order, between, as it were, Scylla 
and Charybdis, for it would be impossible to serve both 
consistently. 
The Greek Realm is preferable to both the dogmatic 
unity of the Oriental Realm and the inevitable bifurca-
tion of the individual in the Roman Realm. The fact 
that the religion of the polis has a non-dogmatic form 
prevents theocracy, i.e., prevents religion and poli-
tics, the latter having a somewhat more definite form, 
from coinciding; and the fact that the aims of religion 
and politics are the same prevents the individual from 
being confused or disoriented. However, the Greek 
polis cannot be the ideal of Hegel's State (Staat), 
since its religion is not Christianity. 
The Christian religion, unlike Greek religion, does 
have a formal structure, and this causes a problem. 
The analysis of the Oriental Realm shows that the forms 
of religion and politics must not coincide, and the 
analysis of the Roman Realm shows that they must not 
differ in content. Thus, in the State, an ideal commu-
nity, religion and politics must differ in form and 
coincide in content, in order to prevent both theo-
cracy, on the one hand, and chaos, on the other hand, 
by the introduction of a form of theonotny. This is the 
condition which Hegel envisions as typifying the 
Germanic Realm. The goal of world history (Weltge-
schichte) is to establish the ethical (sittlich) State, 
in which two apparently contradictory elements are 
reconciled, harmonized, and included in toto: 1) the 
absolute free will of the individual citizen is fully 
preserved, and 2) strict constitutional laws are laid 
down in order to protect rights. Historically, laws 
have generally proven to be hindrances to individual 
liberty, handed down from the rulers to the people. 
Hegel, in contrast, envisions his ideal State as aris-
ing from and maintaining itself by the free will of 
each individual citizen. No longer a matter of the 
citizen bending in order to fit into the stiff mold of 
the established order, the State will be a free insti-
tution designed solely for the purpose of completely 
fulfilling every citizen's ethical and economic needs. 
It will not, however, be a democracy; in form it will 
be somewhat analogous to the Family, a unified commu-
nity based on love and mutual concern, not an aggre-
gated society based on contract.* 
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Hegel'8 ideal of the State based on the unified 
will of free individuals, instead of on "contract," 
compromise, or majority rule, is modeled after the 
ekklesia of the Mew Testament; and the State is the 
worldly analogue of the spiritual ekklesia as each 
stands in contrast to secular concerns and to Civil 
Society. The ethical order of life (Sittlichkeit) 
characteristic of the State is a theonomy, in which 
divinely inspired law and right permeate the entire es-
tablished order. The spiritual content from which the 
power of the State issues is subjective spirit, or free 
individuality, reconciled to the divine will--a basis 
of government which distinctly separates Hegel's theory 
from that of Rousseau and, somewhat less sharply, from 
that of Kant. The State, for Hegel, is a "strucure of 
rights," not just a product of history, not just a 
strong legal or political force, but a Rechtsstaat. 
The subjective will is freedom; the good is "the 
substantial universal of freedom."* Since their iden-
tity cannot be accurately or completely captured by 
codified law, Sittlichkeit cannot be legislated. In-
deed, it is love--not agape, the indiscriminate altru-
ism toward all human beings, but eros (in the non-
sexual sense, of course), the compelling desire for 
something absent and probably unattainable—which is 
the real basis of Sittlichkeit. This love is a driving 
passion for God, eros for the transcendent, and an 
equally vigorous patriotic fervor, Volksgeist, which 
together form the foundation of the State. The great 
love the citizen has for the State is not fascism, jin-
goism, or chauvinism, for always God comes first, and 
God's universal moral law, as in Kant, is always the 
final authority for human conduct. Hegel was no proto-
Nazi. 1 
The clear distinction in the German language be-
tween Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft has been widely 
utilized by historians of religion since the sociolo-
gist Ferdinand Tdnnies formulated the dichotomy syste-
matically in 1887.' Briefly, Gesellschaft is a plural-
istic "society" or "association" of" individuals in 
which the primary word is 'I'; whereas Gemeinschaft is 
a single unified "community" of members in which the 
primary word is 'we'. Gemeinschaften are typical of 
religious institutions; Gesellschaften are typical of 
secular or political institutions. Certainly it would 
be the exception rather than the rule to find a relig-
ious group based on a contractual union, or a secular 
group based on a spiritual union. In a social organi-
zation, Gesellschaft, each member looks after his own 
interests only, while in an ecclesiastical organiza-
tion, Gemeinschaft, all members look after one ano-
ther's interests with equal love and concern. 
The Gemeinschaft relationship in Hegel 7 is not 
fellpw-feeling with regard to the other members of the 
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community as individuals. Instead of this one-many 
relationship, it is essentially a one-one relationship 
between two individuals of different ontological types. 
One individual is in fact the member, but the other 
"individual" is the body of which he or she is a 
member. 
The two ethical/political theories to which Hegel's 
Rechtsphilosophie may be seen as a conscious reaction, 
i.e.,Kant's and Rousseau's, each view human interac-
tion in terms of "society" or Gesellschaft, while Hegel 
believes the best possible ethical/political establish-
ment to be a "community" or Gemeinschaft. The univer-
sally guided Gesellschaft is the ideal of Kant, and the 
freely contracted Gesellschaft is the ideal of Rous-
seau; but the freely willed Gemeinschaft is the ideal 
of Hegel. Whereas the fundamental principle of Rous-
seau's government and of Kant's juridico-civil state of 
affairs (Zustand) is law, the fundamental principle of 
Hegel's State is individual free will, which is the 
Christian and Kantian fundamental principle of morality 
in general. Law, not fundamental but still important, 
is Bufgehoben in Hegel's State as codified rationality, 
as constitutional law, and as the fundamental principle 
of Civil Society (biirgerliche Gesellschaft). 
Note that since all Gemeinschaften are spiritual 
unions, their fundamental principle must be either 
theocratic power or free will. Since all Gesells-
chaf ten are contractual unions, their fundamental prin-
ciple must be some form of humanly codified law. 
Hegel was wise enough to see that theocracy was not 
the answer to the question of how to make an earthly 
government which would be at once politically judicious 
and morally upright. He saw that the ultimate solution 
could not come down to the people, but had to rise up 
into the universal from each individual. He saw that 
for morality to be preserved, free will, the ground of 
morality, must also be preserved; thus, the State can-
not be based on law if it is to be moral. However, 
since it is a political body, and not purely a moral 
body, as the earthly ekklesia would be, law must be 
included in it, even though not as its basis. 
Spiritual life, an integral aspect of God, is for 
the human individual a Prozess,* a movement towards 
God. To place one's goals in the world of matter or 
sarx is to deny life itself. Life is a unity, what 
Hegel calls an Einheit and what the New Testament calls 
a henotes; whereas the denial of life, i.e., the 
denial of the spirit of God, is, in the language of the 
New Testament, a schisma. Absolute Spirit is the union 
of subjective spirit with God, the Absolute Idea; this 
union has two forms, earthly and heavenly, each of 
which may be designated by the New Testament term, ek-
klesia: 
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Religion, as this highest sphere may be called in 
general, is to be considered not only as proceed-
ing from and finding itself in the subject, but 
also, and just as much, as proceeding objectively 
from Absolute Spirit, which, as spirit, is in the 
community (Gemeinde) of spirit.* 
Religion, therefore, at once unites the believer with 
God in the heavenly ekklesia, and just as solidly with 
his or her fellow believers in the earthly ekklesia. 
The dialectical movement of the particular and the 
universal toward the concrete universal can be identi-
fied as the movement of the penultimate Johannine dual-
ism of fleshly plurality and spiritual oneness toward 
the Kingdom of God. But the end of this movement oc-
curs in the other world; the this worldly end of world 
history is the establishment of the State, the politi-
cal embodiment of Sittlichkeit, which contains and 
protects within it the earthly ekklesia," the relig-
ious embodiment of Sittlichkeit. 
In the genuinely Pauline letters 1 1 the earthly 
ekklesia is described metaphorically in terms of a 
physical body; however, not only are its members simply 
"organs" (melos, sing.; mele, pi.) in the body, but 
they are also individual members in themselves as free 
human beings. Insofar as each person is tied to God, 
that person is spiritually one with God; and insofar as 
such a person is a member of God's church on earth, 
that person is spiritually one with all other believ-
ers. 1 1 These two species of oneness are only conceptu-
ally distinguishable, for in reality the earthly 
ekklesia could not exist without the heavenly 
ekklesia, and vice versa. Unless infused with the 
spirit of God, the earthly ekklesia would be just ano-
ther earthly Gesellschaft; and, apart from the unified 
"body" of human believers, the spirit of God would be 
just an abstract idea of God, lacking concrete reali-
zation. 
The earthly ekklesia is a spiritual Gemeinschaft; 
it is not the equivalent of the institutionalized 
church(es) on earth. The church member may or may not 
also be a member of the earthly ekklesia; and the mem-
ber of the earthly ekklesia may or may not also be a 
member of the institutionalized church, though he or 
she is necessarily a member of the heavenly ekklesia. 
The earthly ekklesia, unlike the church, is not mor-
tal, though it is composed of mortals united in their 
worship of God. The heavenly ekklesia is the eternal 
spiritual union of immortal souls with their God. 
Perhaps the subtle and somewhat elusive distinction 
can be expressed in this way: Insofar as a person, as 
an immortal soul, worships God and loves his or her 
fellow immortal souls, that person is a member of the 
heavenly ekklesia; while insofar as a person, as a 
mortal being, worships God and loves his or her fellow 
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mortal beings as subjective individuals, that person is 
a member of the earthly ekklesia; and insofar as a 
person is a member of an institutionalized church, that 
person is a member of a Gesellschaft. The heavenly 
ekklesia is the ultimate Kingdom of God. The earthly 
ekklesia is an image of the heavenly ekklesia; and 
the institutionalized church is an image of the heaven-
ly ekklesia; and the institutionalized church is an 
image of the earthly ekklesia. This is the hierarchi-
cal organization of the Christian religion, comprising 
both its this worldly and its other worldly aspects. 
On the last day mortality will be transfigured and the 
final Kingdom of God will exist as the heavely 
ekklesia, the earthly ekklesia having been aufgehoben 
within it. 
In the area of political organization there can be 
nothing analogous to the heavenly ekklesia, which has 
no earthly form of existence. Consequently, the Hegel-
ian State, i.e., a Gemeinschaft analogous to the earth-
ly ekklesia, is as high as political organization can 
go. Most governments are Gesellschaften, each citizen 
freely serving only his or her own interests; but in 
Hegel s State, each citizen freely serves both his or 
her own interests, insofar as the State contains Civil 
Society, and the interests of the whole community, in-
sofar as the State is an embodiment of Sittlichkeit. 
Hegel'8 Sittlichkeit is a kind of theonomy. 1 1 True 
Sittlichkeit can only be manifested in a Christian 
Gemeinschaft. Thus, world history demands the move 
from the fragmented, pagan quasi-Sittlichkeit of the 
Greek Realm to the genuine Sittlichkeit which issues 
from the genuine religion, Christianity, in the German-
ic State. But the mere introduction of the Christian 
kerygma into the world is not enough to accomplish this 
transition; history must pass through the dialectical 
phase of the Roman Realm as it moves from the Greek 
Realm to the Germanic. 1* Christianity must first stand 
in direct opposition to the civil government or politi-
cal order before it becomes freely accepted as the pop-
ular religion (Volksreliglon) of the new State. 
In the Roman Realm, Christianity is a "positive" 
religion, i.e., it is institutionalized in such a way 
as to emphasize its objective formality over against 
its subjective spirituality. In the Germanic State, 
Christianity will no longer be "positive"--rigid, doc-
trinaire, static—but rather a Volksreliglon like that 
of the polis. Thus, the power of the Volksgeist mani-
fested in the citizens of the State will be evident in 
their religion. Christianity as a "positive" religion 
is identified with the institutionalized church; as a 
Volksre1igion it is identified with the earthly ekkle-
sia. '* 
The history of Christianity thus far has occurred 
in the context of the "Roman" Realm. This is even true 
today; Hegel would be the first to admit that his 
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"Germanic" Realm has not yet been actualized in his-
tory. Though church and government, in the West, are 
formally separate, they still differ in content; and 
theonomy, which can be established only by the free act 
of individual wills unifying the content of religion 
and politics, has not yet been achieved. If, there-
fore, the Roman Realm may be metaphorically described 
as the "Good Friday" of world history, then the 
Germanic Realm of the theonomic State may be described 
as its "Easter," yet to come. We are now living on 
"Holy Saturday." 
As the Roman Realm is a dualism between the moral 
and the political, it is thus analogous to the Johan-
nine dualism between the one, i.e., God, or good, and 
the many, i.e., sarx, or evil. And just as evil is 
constantly being transformed in the cosmic mythical 
event of the Christian Transfiguration, and aufgehoben 
into the heavenly ekklesia; so is the selfishly moti-
vated, godless legalism of the Roman Realm to be trans-
formed in the historical event of transfiguration, and 
aufgehoben into the Germanic State. In the same way, 
as the penultimate Christian dualism between good and 
evil is resolved in favor of good, thus saving the free 
individual; so the penultimate dualism of the Roman 
Realm between (Kantian) morality (Moral!tat) and 
legalism is resolved in favor of Sittlichkeit, thus 
saving the free individual. With the transfiguration 
of the Roman Realm, the religious order, no longer the 
rival of the political order for the loyalty of the 
citizens, need no longer function primarily as the in-
stitutionalized church, but may now freely and openly 
function as the earthly ekklesia, in harmony with the 
goals of the newly aufgehoben political institutions. 
The Roman Realm, as we have seen, is dualistic, the 
two poles of the dualism being religion and politics, 
at odds with each other. The Oriental Realm—monis-
tic—stresses unity and communality or single-minded-
ness at all costs. The Greek Realm—pluralistic— 
stresses individual worth and differences. All three 
realms are aufgehoben in the Germanic Realm, which may 
accordingly be called a "teleological monism." In the 
Germanic State, founded on theonomic Sittlichkeit, 1) 
the whole community works toward the same goal (the 
monistic element); 2) the religious order and the 
political order work toward the same goal (the dual-
istic element); and 3) the plurality of free individu-
als works toward the same goal (the pluralistic 
element). The final State, as a concrete universal, is 
an artificial or synthetic monism, i.e., a monistic 
synthesis of monarchism, individualism, and the dualism 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. " 
In the Roman Realm no Volksgeist guides or unites 
the people; this deficiency makes the Roman Realm 
unique among the four, since even in the Oriental Realm 
there is a sort of Volksgeist, though it is imposed 
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from above. Of course, the highest, most concrete, 
manifestation of Volksgeist is, and indeed must be, in 
the Germanic State. 
Hegel refers to the Roman Realm in his Phenomeno-
logy of Spirit as a Rechtszustand, a term which in this 
case, given the abstract, unactualized nature of the 
"right," is better rendered by 'legal status' than by 
the more literal 'condition of right'. Hegel's use of 
the term is fairly derogatory. 1 7 The idea he wishes to 
convey is that of a Gesellschaft based entirely on the 
rigors of codified law, in which an empty, formalized 
legalism has thoroughly destroyed any concrete basis of 
morality.*' 
In the Kantian language of Tillich, the basic con-
fict is between autonomy and heteronomy. In one's 
dealings with God, one is always autonomous and free; 
but in one's dealings in society one is subject to 
heteronomous influences and is somewhat compromised, 
though that person may prosper economically. The in-
dividual is unfulfilled when his or her degree of au-
tonomy in the community is reduced, and the community 
suffers when one individual's autonomy grows to rival 
the autonomy of others. Thus, individual autonomy and 
communal heteronomy, which is really an aggregate of 
individual autonomies, seesaw back and forth in histo-
ry, with the result that neither the individual nor the 
community realizes his, her, or its full potential. 
This "seesaw" process typifies and defines the Roman 
Realm. 
The solution to the constant struggle between au-
tonomy and heteronomy is the creation of a theonomy, or 
roughly the condition that Hegel imagines was the case 
in ancient Greece, where a Volksreligion was an inte-
gral component of the society. Theonomy is not theo-
cracy, for in the latter only the rulers are viewed as 
being guided by God's law, while in the former God's 
law permeates the life of the entire social order. 
Tillich says that theonomy preserves autonomy in all of 
its depth for every individual and for the community as 
a whole. (Theocracy, of course, is an imposed dicta-
torship.) However, he is pessimistic that such a state 
should ever come to exist on earth, short of a divine 
revelation of reason, given the restraining conditions 
of human existence. 1 9 
Hegel's ardor for Greek Sittlichkeit and Greek 
Volksreligion seems to have cooled between the time of 
The Positivity of the Christian Religion (1795) and the 
time of the Rechtsphilosophie (1820). Apparently, he 
gradually developed a more sober view of the real con-
ditions in the polis. For example, when Hegel discus-
ses ancient Greece in the Theologische Jugendschriften 
he does not mention Antigone at all. 2 0 But in the 
Phenomenology Hegel says that even though Antigone 
acted ethically in burying her brother, i.e., in obey-
ing the duties proper to a woman in a sister/brother 
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relationship, she is a tragic figure because in per-
forming this primary duty she was forced to neglect her 
less important duty to her king. Hegel does not expect 
either her or Creon to feel any guilt. Since she is 
right with respect to her duty to the family, just as 
Creon is right with respect to his duty to the politi-
cal order, to give commands and to expect his subjects 
to obey them, each is morally blameless as they oppose 
each other. 2 1 Elaborating on this problem in the 
Rechtsphilosophie, Hegel places the blame on the struc-
ture of the polis itself, and asserts that both family 
piety and civil authority must be aufgehoben in the 
truly ethical (sittlich) State, so that they may never 
be . in conflict and may never contribute to the detri-
ment of the individual, as they were and did in Thebes 
and, more generally, throughout the Greek and Roman 
Realms. 2 2 Similarly, all potentially dichotomous moral 
positions must be aufgehoben or reconciled in the final 
State. 
It must be remembered that the Christian dualism 
between the monistic spiritual Gemeinschaft and the 
pluralistic earthly Gesellschaften is only a penulti-
mate dualism, really a dualism between monism and 
pluralism, with the monistic element gradually expand-
ing to engulf the pluralistic element and finally to 
become absolute in actuality. 2' 
Though Hegel indeed saw people as primarily social 
beings, he nevertheless refused to see any identifica-
tion of the actual with the rational outside of the 
context of Christianity. We may even say that, for 
Hegel, becoming a Christian means recognizing the pres-
ence of rationality in what we see around us: "It is 
no doubt to be remembered, that the result of indepen-
dent thought harmonizes with the import of the Chris-
tian religion:—for the Christian religion is a revela-
tion of reason." 2* 
For the Left Hegelians, rationality is something to 
be actualized by creating it out of the present situa-
tion; Hegel could only call them "adolescent." 2' But 
for the Right Hegelians, rationality is actualized by 
attuning oneself freely to God's foreordained process 
of unfolding history. Free human recognition of the 
rational is itself an active process, and has its secu-
lar as well as its spiritual or religious dimension. 
Religiously, the highest degree of rationality that 
can be actualized on earth is the earthly ekklesia; 
secularly, the highest degree of rationality that can 
be actualized on earth 1B the State. The State, the 
Germanic Realm, will come; it is not up to us to create 
it, for in its essential rationality it is determined. 
The "actual and rational" human being is, therefore, 
philosophically complete, i.e., secularly and relig-
iously, or politically and theologically; he or she is 
both a citizen of the State and a Christian. Even 
though Hegel says that the State has no right to inter-
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fere with anyone's religion,—( n. . . since the content 
of a man's faith depends on his private ideas, the 
State cannot interfere with it"")--it is still in-
conceivable to Hegel that the good citizen of the State 
would not be a Christian. The State can neither be 
atheistic nor admit of any religion except a "genuine" 
religion. Of course, for Hegel, the only "genuine" 
religion is Christianity. The State may not prohibit 
any single religion; thus, each citizen must become a 
Christian of his or her own free will if the State is 
to exist. 
Christianity is a variegated phenomenon. In some 
societies, such as those typified by Hegel as the 
"Roman Realm," there exists the kind of destructive 
bifurcation between Christian church and secular gov-
ernment which Rousseau sees, and which certainly would 
never be the case under Islam, ancient Judaism, or 
other theocratic religions. But being a worthy member 
of either the institutionalized church or the earthly 
ekklesia does not entail poor citizenship, does not 
preclude the establishment of strong and just civil 
government. The opposition between church and state in 
the Christian community need not be a permanent histo-
rical fact. 
Since the dawn of Christianity in the Western 
world, people have come to expect different sorts of 
things from the religious and secular spheres. Essen-
tially, this bifurcation constitutes the dualism of the 
Roman Realm. On the one hand, there is the church, 
unified and purposeful, but with no concern for 
anyone's economic well-being. On the other hand, there 
is the great mass of individuals, isolated from one 
another, begging for some kind of meaningful national 
life and a political order to provide for their basic 
economic needs. As a result, the individual is con-
fused, not knowing whether to starve and be moral, or 
to eat well and be immoral. Thus, all social order 
breaks down, as, historically, it did in the conflict 
between Christianity and Rome. 2 7 In essence this is a 
conflict between the institutionalized church and 
btlrgerliche Gesellschaft, as the individual is torn 
between opposing interests. Between the earthly 
ekklesia and Hegel's State, each of them being a 
Gemeinschaft which resembles the concrete universal, 
there can be no such conflict of individual interests, 
since each, founded on free will, tends toward the same 
end. 
This tendency of the Western individual, when 
thinking or behaving in a secular way, to see the group 
as an aggregate, coupled with the tendency of the same 
individual, when worshipping God, to see the group as a 
unity, led historically to a situation in which the 
same individual functioned on two different levels, as 
a member of 1) the political association and 2) the 
spiritual community. As Hegel sees it, there were no 
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such problems in ancient Greece, as there were in the 
early Middle Ages. The Greek polis was pluralistic and 
individualistic, but the religious community was not a 
separate estate; it was loose in its form but tightly 
interwoven into the political and social life of the 
democratic community. Greek religion's lack of dogma 
and its general flexibility kept the social order from 
becoming a theocracy, and yet, this "folk religion," so 
much a part of everyone's day-to-day life, cemented the 
community together. Since the free individuals of the 
polis, in Hegel's idealized view, freely shared so many 
goals and convictions, Hegel would have had to call 
this pluralistic community, in spite of its pluralism, 
a Gemeinschaft. 
Raymond Plant makes two additional points: 1) that 
Hegel probably developed his idea of the "wedge between 
man qua citizen and man qua child of God" 2' from Rous-
seau's Social Contract, and 2) that, in Hegel's view, 
if Christianity had been a folk religion instead of a 
private religion, such a wedge would never have been 
formed. According to Plant, for Hegel, Greek folk 
religion encouraged "social solidarity" and was "the 
central determinant of the harmony and totality which 
he considered to be the distinguishing mark of Greek 
society;" 1' whereas Christianity, as a private 
religion: 
. . . taught the individual to look beyond and 
outside the social order in which he lived to 
find his ideals and values . . . undermined 
social commitment . . . encouraged the neglect of 
social and political obligations, the morality 
present in society . . . contributed in very 
large measure to the loss of community by stress-
ing inward and private ends as opposed to civic 
and communal ties." 
The conflict of Christianity and the social order 
is characteristic of the Roman Realm, in which two 
Gesellschaften, the institutionalized church(es) and 
the various political institutions, contend for the 
individual's loyalties. Hegel's basic point is that 
politics and religion should not be separate spheres in 
the life of either the individual person or the commu-
nity at large. Nevertheless, although he sees them as 
both moving toward the same concrete universal as their 
goal, he advocates separate earthly manifestations of 
the religious order and the political order. 1 1 He is 
afraid that the spiritual nature of the earthly 
ekklesia embodied in the institutionalized church may 
be perverted by the necessarily secular concerns of the 
political organization. The State is the union of 
freedom and law; the church, in its ideal form as the 
ekklesia, is the union of freedom and divine will. If 
divine will is allowed to interfere in political deci-
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sions, subjective political freedom will be sacrificed 
and a theocracy will ensue. Similarly, if secular co-
dified law is allowed to influence this church in any 
way, the church's spiritual integrity and the right of 
its members to worship as they see fit will be jeopard-
ized. It is therefore essential that church and go-
vernment remain separate to develop normally, each ac-
cording to its own nature, until the final absolute 
standpoint is reached at the level of the concrete 
universal. 
Hegel's State and its church differ only in form, 
i.e., objective, earthly form, but not at all in con-
tent. Both desire as their ultimate goal unity and 
harmony with the universal will. Hegel's State in this 
teleological way is modelled directly after the heaven-
ly ekklesia. To have all individuals aufgehoben to 
the ethical and political level of Sittlichkeit as 
citizens of the free State, and to the spiritual level 
of the Absolute Idea as members of the spiritual body 
of Christ, is Hegel's goal for humankind, consistent 
with his basic systematic claim that religion is the 
proper content of philosophy and that philosophy is the 
proper form (or expression) of religion.' 1 
Volksgeist, for Hegel, is much more than simple 
national feeling; it has its roots in Volksreligion and 
thus is essentially more of a relation between the in-
dividual and his or her God than between the individual 
and his or her country. God, however, is the God of 
the country as well as of the individual; therefore, 
there exists a tripartite internal relation among God, 
the individual, and the country. We call this tripar-
tite relation Volksgeist, and we call the nation which 
exhibits this relation among its citizens the State, or 
the Germanic Realm." 
Genuine religion and genuine religiosity emerge 
only from Sittlichkeit, and religion is the 
thinking Sittlichkeit, i.e., the Sittlichkeit 
which is becoming conscious of the free univer-
sality (Allgemeinheit) of its concrete essence. 
Only from and by Sittlichkeit is the idea of God 
known as free spirit; it is therefore vain to 
seek true religion and religiosity outside of 
sittlich spirit." 
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NOTES 
'This paper is an epitome of my master's thesis, 
"On the Religious Roots of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie" 
(Bryn Mawr College, 1977), directed by Professor George 
L. Kline, whose generous reinforcement of my efforts 
has been and continues to be a major source of whatever 
success I have enjoyed in philosophy. 
'For example, the famous "Owl of Minerva" passage 
in the Preface to the Rechtsphilosophie could easily be 
misused by such a critic, as follows: If philosophy, 
for Hegel, is only able to apprehend the past, since 
the future does not exist to be either known or under-
stood, or even speculated about, then Hegel, in order 
to be consistent, must himself use the data of the 
past, specifically, the historical China, the histori-
cal Greece, etc., as the conceptual basis of his philo-
sophy of history. If these regions and periods are 
meant as illustrations of certain types of historical 
phenomena, then they can only be so used—as illustra-
tions—if they were first the basis of Hegel's concep-
tions of these phenomena. 
'John N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976; London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 354. 
' *Cf. Enz., par. 537. Most of the textual support 
for the argument of this paper is in the third part of 
the 1830 Enz., i.e., Geistesphilosophie, and in the 
third part of the Rechtsphilosophie, i.e., Sittlich-
keit. 
'Rechtsphil., par. 141. 
'Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society: 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, translated by Charles P. 
Loomis, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1957. 
'Although Hegel often uses the term Gesellschaft, 
he does not use the term Gemeinschaft, but rather 
Gemeinde, which has an equivalent meaning, and which, 
indeed, he sometimes explicitly identifies with a 
religious community, e.g., in his Foreword to Hermann 
Hinrichs' Religion im inneren Verbaltnisse zur Wissen-
schaft (1822). 
•Cf. Enz., par. 555. 
'Enz., par. 554. 
l 0Cf. Rechtsphi1., par. 270, where Hegel is em-
phatic that the political and the religious orders must 
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contain each other, must play counterpoint to each 
other, and above all, must be completely one in content 
and completely distinct from each other in form: "Wenn 
die wesentliche Einheit derselben [d.h. des Staates 
und der KircheJ die der Wahrheit der Grundsatze und 
Gesinnung 1st, so 1st ebenso wesentlich, dass mit 
dieser Einheit der Unterschied, den sie in der Form 
ihres Bewusstseins haben, zur besonderen Existenz 
gekommen sei." 
"E.g., 1 Cor 12:4-27, Col 1:18, and Col 1:24. 
"Cf. Rom 12:4-5. 
"Here and throughout this paper, the term 'theono-
my' is used in the sense which Tillich established for 
it in Systematic Theology. 
"Cf. Mt 10:34-39. 
"Hegel's idea of the "positivity" of a religion 
was fully developed in his early essay, The Positivity 
of the Christian Religion (1795) and was not signifi-
cantly altered during his lifetime. 
"Cf. Shlomo Avineri, Hegel 1s Theory of the Modern 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
pp. 28-33. 
l TCf. J. Loewenberg, Hegel's "Phenomenology": Dia-
logues on the Life of Mind (La Salle, Illinois: Open 
Court, 1965), pp. 202-06. 
"Cf. Edward Caird, Hegel (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 
1886 (1883]), p. 206. 
"In Systematic Theology Tillich gives the impres-
sion that he is very much a Hegelian, an impression not 
always conveyed by his other books. Certainly Til-
lich' s idea of a theonomy in which the will of God is 
immanent in all the world derives from Hegel's thought. 
Each of the concepts in the following passage from 
Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1951), I, 85, has its analogue in the 
Rechtsphilosophie: "Autonomy and heteronomy are rooted 
in theonomy, and each goes astray when their theonomous 
unity is broken. Theonomy does not mean the acceptance 
of a divine law imposed on reason by a highest authori-
ty; it means autonomous reason united with its own 
depth. In a theonomous situation reason actualizes it-
self in obedience to its structural laws and in the 
power of its own inexhaustible ground. Since God 
(theos) is the law (nomos) for both the structure and 
the ground of reason, they are united in him, and their 
unity is manifest in a theonomous situation." 
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"I.e., neither in the 1907 Tiibingen collection 
edited by Herman Nohl, nor in the 1948 English transla-
tion by T. M. Knox (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press); nor is she mentioned in this connection in the 
definitive work on Hegel's juvenile period, Hegel's 
Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801 by H. S. 
Harris (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). 
2 IG. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans, 
by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 284 ff. ; 
Phanomeno1ogie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1952), p. 336 f. 
"Cf. Rechtsphil., par. 166. 
"Cf. Emil L. Fackenhelra, The Religious Dimension 
in Hegel's Thought (Boston: Beacon, 1970 11967)), pp. 
148-49. 
"Enz., par. 36 Zusatz. This translation is from 
Hegel'8 Logic, trans, by William Wallace (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1975 11873)), p. 57. 
"Cf. George L. Kline, "Some Recent Reinterpreta-
tions of Hegel's Philosophy," The Monist 48 (1964): 
48-49. 
"Rechtsphil., par. 270. Based on T. M. Knox's 
translation. 
2 7Cf. Rechtsphil., par. 357. 
"Raymond Plant, Hegel (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1973), p. 35. 
"Ibid., p. 34. 
"Ibid., pp. 34-35. Cf. also pp. 177-79 on the 
four realms as a whole. 
"Cf. Rechtsphil., par. 270. 
"Cf. Fackenheim, op. cit., pp. 160-61, and a note 
p. 259. While religion and philosophy have the same 
content, religion has it only in the form of Vorstel-
lung, and philosophy gives it its proper form as 
Begriff• Cf. esp. Enz., Second Preface (1827). 
"Cf. Rechtsphil., par. 358-59. 
"Enz., par. 552. 
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